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WASHINGTON'S DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY
DOCTRINE AND NEGLIGENT EARLY
RELEASE DECISIONS: PAROLE
AND WORK RELEASE
Abstract: The Washington Supreme Court has held the discretionary
immunity doctrine to constitute a highly circumscribed exception to the
rule of governmental liability. An analysis of Washington case law
reveals that parole and work release determinations properly fall outside
the pale of the exception. A negligent decision to place a sex or violent
offender in a parole or work release program therefore should subject
the state to liability. The Author proposes a negligence-based liability
rule that would create incentives to due care on the part of state admin-
istrators responsible for parole and work release decisions without
imposing an unreasonable burden on the state.
The decision to place a violent or sex offender on parole or work
release carries with it the potential for harm, particularly if the
offender poses a significant risk of recidivism. This risk is magnified if
a candidate is negligently evaluated as being an appropriate subject for
one of these programs. State liability for the negligent assignment of
dangerous persons to early release1 programs is an important question
in any legal scheme that seeks to promote accountability and due care
on the part of state agencies.
The Washington legislature abolished sovereign immunity in 1961
and 1967, giving the state judiciary a mandate to adjudicate suits
against governmental entities for tortious conduct.2 Since that time,
however, the Washington Supreme Court has limited tort recovery
against the state and its subdivisions by two principal means: the dis-
cretionary immunity exception and the public duty doctrine. The dis-
cretionary immunity exception shields governmental entities from
liability for considered discretionary decisions in the realm of basic
policy.3 By contrast, the public duty doctrine shields such entities
1. "Early release" refers to parole and work release, as distinguished from earned early
release. Earned early release is not a discretionary decision. See WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.92.151
(1989).
2. The legislature abrogated state tort immunity in 1961, id. § 4.92.090; it abolished
immunity for all governmental entities in 1967, id. § 4.96.010.
3. Discretionary immunity shields officials engaged in the "formulation of public policy"
from suits based on "basic policy determinations." Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 105, 768
P.2d 481, 493 (1989), rev'd sub nom. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied,
110 S. CL 1118 (1990).
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from liability for duties owed the public at large but to no one person
in particular.4
This Comment will demonstrate that negligent parole and work
release decisions should subject the state to liability, both under the
present judicial formulation of the discretionary immunity exception
and for compelling reasons of public policy. First, early release deci-
sions do not fall within the parameters of the exception as they have
been established by the Washington Supreme Court. Second, liability
would create incentives for early release administrators to exercise
care commensurate with the dangerousness of their activities and in
accordance with their statutory mandates. This Comment proposes a
negligence-based liability rule for parole and work release determina-
tions that would promote due care and provide a remedy, while at the
same time insulating the state from frivolous suits.
I. THE CONTEXT: THE OPERATION OF EARLY RELEASE
PROGRAMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY
State administrators frequently make parole and work release deter-
minations regarding individuals who have committed violent or sex
crimes. Whether these decisions are subject to liability if negligently
made turns on the Washington Supreme Court's elaboration of the
discretionary immunity exception.
A. In the Wake of the Sentencing Reform Act
The criminal justice system in Washington has changed drastically
in recent years. Before July 1, 1984, the state sentencing system was
animated by the legislative policy of rehabilitation.' In the typical
case, a felon received two sentences: a statutory maximum term of
imprisonment, and an "indeterminate" minimum term subject to
change in accordance with the offender's rehabilitative progress.6 The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) ushered in a "determinate"
sentencing system of fixed sentences effective July 1, 1984, emphasiz-
4. See, e.g., Honcoop v. State, III Wash. 2d 182, 188, 759 P.2d 1188, 1192 (1988).
Discretionary immunity is the first barrier a plaintiff must surmount to bring suit against the
state. The public duty doctrine also shields the state from suit, but is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
5. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1989); D. BOERNER, SENTENCING IN
WASHINGTON § 2.2(b) (1985) [hereinafter BOERNER].




ing punishment and public safety.7 Despite the Act's focus on safety,
however, a high proportion of violent and sex offenders have been
channeled out of prison and into the community through parole and
work release during the period the SRA has been in effect.8
L Parole
The Sentencing Reform Act did not repeal the indeterminate sen-
tencing system; rather, it made the system inapplicable to offenders
whose crimes of conviction occurred after June 30, 1984.1 Prior to the
SRA, the trial judge pronounced a statutorily authorized maximum
sentence for a given crime, and the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles
set the minimum term of actual imprisonment. 10 The SRA
redesignated the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles as the Indetermi-
nate Sentence Review Board (ISRB). 11 The ISRB, still commonly
referred to as the parole board, retains the same functions as its prede-
cessor for offenders sentenced for crimes committed before July 1,
1984.12
The Washington legislature has prescribed the criteria by which
parole decisions for pre-SRA offenders must be made. Parole shall not
be granted unless, in the board's opinion, the inmate's "rehabilitation
has been complete and he is a fit subject for release."13 In addition,
the board must "thoroughly inform itself as to the facts" of the per-
son's offense and the "convict as a personality" before setting condi-
tions for release.14 The board must also consider the SRA sentencing
guidelines and attempt to make decisions "reasonably consistent" with
them.15 In its 1989-90 session the legislature elevated public safety
considerations to the "highest piority" in parole board decisions. 6
The board also formulates criteria for duration of confinement and
7. Id. § 9.94A.010. The SRA structures the length of confinement for felonies by means of a
grid of presumptive sentence ranges that take into account the nature of the present offense and
the offender's criminal history. See id. §§ 9.94A.310-.370.
8. See infra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
9. WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.95.900 (1989).
10. Id. §§ 9.95.010, .011, .040, .052.
11. This change became effective July 1, 1986. Id. § 9.95.001. The ISRB is scheduled for
extinction June 30, 1998. Id
12. Act of January 24, 1990, Second Substitute Senate Bill No. 6259, § 9.95.009, 1990 Wash.
Legis. Serv. 9 (West) [hereinafter Act of January 24, 1990].
13. Id. § 9.95.009(2).
14. Id. § 9.95.170.
15. Id. § 9.95.009(2).
16. Id. § 9.95.009(3).
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parole,"v and promulgates its own administrative guidelines and
procedures. 18
Implementation of the SRA coincided with more expeditious parole
for many violent and sex offenders. During the first two years of the
Act, felons convicted under the pre-SRA system filed a multitude of
suits to compel retroactive application of generally shorter SRA
sentences.19 In 1986, two such suits resulted in judicial decisions
whose joint effect was to require the parole board to review the mini-
mum sentences of the entire population of inmates whose crimes
occurred prior to July 1, 1984, in light of the SRA's standard sentenc-
ing ranges.20 As a result of this review, the board reduced minimum
terms an average of thirty-two months, 21 and forty percent of the pop-
ulation became eligible for accelerated parole release.22
During the period of sentence review,23 the inmates granted parole
eligibility were drawn from a population comprised primarily of per-
sons who had committed violent or sex crimes.24 The parole board
itself characterized the inmates under its jurisdiction at the time as
"predominantly very serious offenders who will and do present a seri-
ous risk to public safety if one uses their prior criminal history as a
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.017 (1989). These criteria are presented in INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE REV. BD. REP. TO THE LEGISLATURE (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter ISRB REP., Mar.
1987].
18. See Indeterminate Sentence Rev. Bd., Rules and Procedures, adopted Sept., 11, 1989
[hereinafter Rules].
19. 1985-87 AGENCIES OF THE STATE OF WASH. BIENNIAL REP. 26 (Mar. 1988).
20. Addleman v. Board. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash. 2d 503, 510-11, 730 P.2d
1327, 1332 (1986); In re Myers, 105 Wash. 2d 257, 268-69, 714 P.2d 303, 309 (1986).
21. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE REV. BD. REP. TO THE LEGISLATURE 11 (Jan. 1988)
[hereinafter ISRB REP., Jan. 1988].
22. Id. at 7. A total of 1,663 inmates became eligible for parole as a result of sentence review.
Id. Inmates granted accelerated parole eligibility are eligible for immediate parole, pending
approval of an acceptable parole plan. Id. at 12. Although sentence review was mandatory,
findings of parolability were not. The Addleman and Myers courts did not relieve the board of its
statutory obligation to grant parole only if, in its opinion, an inmate's rehabilitation is complete.
Rather, they indicated that the board retained the latitude, upon submission of adequate written
reasons, to impose sentences not in conformance with the SRA. Addleman, 107 Wash. 2d at 511,
730 P.2d at 1332; Myers, 105 Wash. 2d at 265-66, 714 P.2d at 307-08; see also Act of January 24,
1990, supra, note 12 (the board may set minimum terms outside the SRA sentencing range upon
submission of adequate written reasons for doing so).
23. The sentence review was conducted in two phases, March 1, 1986 through July 30, 1986,
and October 15, 1986 through September 15, 1987. ISRB REP., Jan. 1988, supra note 21, at
9-10.
24. For example, the board characterized 85% of the 4,983 inmates under its authority as of
February 27, 1987, as "serious person offenders." Of these inmates, 688 had committed murder
or manslaughter; 1,468, rape 1 or 2, statutory rape 1 or 2, or indecent liberties; and 1,456, assault
I or 2 or robbery 1 or 2. Id. at 1. ISRB REP., Mar. 1987, supra note 17, at 1.
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predictor of risk."'2  Similarly, about ninety-five percent of the offend-
ers remaining under parole board jurisdiction as of February 1990
were "serious, violent" offenders.26
2. Work Release
The SRA defines work release as "a program of partial confinement
available to offenders who are employed or engaged as a student [sic]
in a regular course of study at school."27 It is available to most first-
time violent and sex offenders whose crimes of conviction occurred
after June 30, 1984, the effective date of the SRA.28
Work release decisions for violent and sex offenders effectively
reside with the Department of Corrections, 9 whose discretion is
framed and limited by department guidelines and procedures. 0 Work
release may be denied, for example, if an inmate is incarcerated for an
offense that involves victim injury requiring medical treatment. It
may also be denied if the offense involves sexual aggression, if the
work release facility is located near the victim's residence, or if the
offender has threatened the victim while incarcerated. Another guide-
line allows' denial of work release if an offender has attracted extensive
media attention, and placement in the community can be expected to
generate negative public reaction.31 A 1990 amendment stipulating
25. ISRB REP., Mar. 1987, supra note 17, at 2.
26. Telephone interview with Kathryn S. Bail, Chair, Indeterminate Sentence Review Board
(Feb. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Bail] (notes on file with Washington Law Review). Approximately
2,500 offenders remain under the custody of the parole board. Id
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(33) (1989).
28. See Dep't of Corrections, Policy 300.380, Classification-Custody Level, effective July 1,
1989, at 2 [hereinafter Policy 300.380]. According to Department of Corrections guidelines,
work release is prohibited for murder 1 felons (unless approved in writing by the Secretary of the
Department) and for offenders convicted of first-degree rape, during the first three years of
confinement. Id Although the statute does not proscribe work release for violent and sex
offenders whose crimes of conviction occurred prior to the SRA, Department of Corrections
guidelines do. Id; see also WASH. REv. CODE § 72.65.100 (1989) (authorizing the Secretary of
the Department of Corrections to establish guidelines for the administration of the work release
program).
29. The Secretary of the Department of Corrections may permit inmates to participate in
work release, but only if participation is authorized pursuant to the inmate's sentence or to
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.150 (1989) (limiting work release to the final six months of an
offender's sentence). Id. § 72.65.200 (1989).
30. For offenders sentenced for crimes committed before July 1, 1984, the work release
decision resides by statute with the superintendent of the state correctional institution in which a
prisoner is confined. The superintendent must carefully study the inmate's institutional conduct,
attitude, and behavior, as well as his criminal history and any relevant case history. Based on
this evaluation, the superintendent must determine whether there is a reasonable basis for
believing that the prisoner will "honor his trust" in the work release program. Id § 72.65.040.
31. Policy 300.380, supra note 28, at 2; see also Div. of Community Corrections, Dep't of
Corrections, Div. Directive DIR 800-W, Screening of Work Release Candidates, effective Mar. 1,
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public safety as the paramount decision making criterion also limits
the discretion of Department of Corrections personnel in supervising
sexually violent offenders.32
Although these guidelines could have been expected to restrict work
release to less dangerous offenders, a large percentage of program par-
ticipants in recent years have been incarcerated for violent and sex
crimes. 33  As of December 31, 1989, 25.7% of work releasees had
"violent crime convictions,"34  and 12.1% had committed sex
offenses. 35 As of the end of the preceding fiscal year, June 30, 1989,
the ratios were 30.4% and 17.8%, respectively;36 a year before that,
they were 42.6% and 31.0%."7
B. The Discretionary Immunity Exception In Washington
The Washington Supreme Court has defined the scope of discretion-
ary immunity narrowly, repeatedly designating it a highly circum-
scribed exception to the rule of governmental liability.38 To qualify
for immunity, an official act must involve discretion, it must rise to the
1989 (establishing guidelines for the selection of offenders for placement in work release
facilities).
32. Act of January 24, 1990, supra note 12.
33. The data that follow have been derived by the Author from official tables that do not
indicate the extent to which the figures presented for "violent" crimes may overlap with those for
"sex" crimes.
34. See FY 1990 DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS AND WORK TRAINING RELEASE
CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS AND POPULATION MOVEMENT REP. table 2c. This figure and those
given in the text accompanying notes 35-37 include the category of "pre release," a form of work
release defined by the Department of Corrections for internal purposes as "[tiotal confinement in
a community setting." Id. at iv. Prior to fiscal year 1989, the department included both
categories of work release under the single heading of "work release" in the annual reports from
which these statistics were calculated.
35. See id. table 2b. This percentage and those for sex offenders given in the text
accompanying notes 36-37, infra, represent the total number of inmates listed as serving
sentences for specific sex crimes, divided by the total number of work releasees.
36. FY 1989 DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS AND WORK TRAINING RELEASE
CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS AND POPULATION MOVEMENT REP. tables 2c, 2b.
37. FY 1988 DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS AND WORK TRAINING RELEASE
CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS AND POPULATION MOVEMENT REP. tables 2c, 2b. As of June 30,
1987, the ratios were 40.6% and 28.8%. FY 1987 DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS AND
WORK TRAINING RELEASE CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS AND POPULATION MOVEMENT REP.
tables 2c, 2b.
38. See, e.g., Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 433, 671 P.2d 230, 240 (1983)
(discretionary immunity an "extremely limited exception"); Chambers-Castanes v. King County,
100 Wash. 2d 275, 281, 669 P.2d 451, 456 (1983) (a "narrowly circumscribed exception");
Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 587, 664 P.2d 492, 497 (1983) (a "very narrow
exception").
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level of basic policy, and it must be the product of a considered
decision.3 9
1. The Evangelical Test: Discretionary and Ministerial Acts
In 1965, the Washington Supreme Court in Evangelical United
Brethren Church ofAdna v. State' created an exception to the rule of
governmental tort liability: "discretionary" acts are immune; "minis-
terial" (or "operational") acts are not.41 Although clarified in later
decisions,42 the Evangelical test still serves as the starting point for
determining whether a given act is immune.
In Evangelical, a church sought damages from the state for a fire set
by an escapee from a juvenile corrections facility.43 The juvenile had
set fires in the past, and in the present instance was being returned to
the facility with an official recommendation that he be regarded as a
security risk and accorded close supervision. He was assigned to
boiler room detail, from which he escaped and set the fires that were
the basis for the suit.'
The court held that the decisions to maintain a medium-security
program at the facility and to assign the boy to it were discretionary
acts and hence not subject to liability.4" The state was, however, liable
for any negligence that could be shown in the ministerial decision to
39. For a cogent summary of these requirements, see Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash.
2d 307, 335-36, 678 P.2d 803, 818-19 (1984).
40. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965)
41. Id. at 254-55, 407 P.2d at 444. The state statutes abrogating sovereign immunity in
Washington do not explicitly retain immunity for the discretionary acts of government agents:
"The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be
liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private
person or corporation." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1989); see also id. § 4.96.010 (abolishing
sovereign immunity for state subdivisions). By contrast, the Federal Tort Claims Act explicitly
exempts discretionary acts from liability. Tort claims against the federal government cannot be
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). Under federal law, the sole
element necessary to relieve the government of liability is discretion; under Washington law,
mere discretion is not enough. See infra notes 47-77 and accompanying text (discussing the
requisites of discretionary immunity in Washington).
42. In particular, the supreme court has emphasized that only acts requiring the exercise of
basic policy discretion qualify for the immunity. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
43. 67 Wash. 2d at 247-52, 407 P.2d at 441-43.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 257-59, 407 P.2d at 446-47. One commentator has questioned whether the court
properly applied its own test to the state's decision to place the juvenile in a medium-security
facility. See Survey of Washington Law, Discretionary Acts Protected by Governmental
Immunity, 41 WASH. L. REv. 552, 555 n.14 (1966).
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assign the boy to boiler room detail and in failing to timely notify law
enforcement agencies of his escape.46
The Evangelical court formulated a test to determine whether offi-
cial acts qualify for discretionary immunity:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve
a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the ques-
tioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or accom-
plishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which
would not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or
objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of
basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the gov-
ernmental agency involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and
duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision?
47
If the answers to these questions are yes, the challenged act, omis-
sion, or decision is discretionary and therefore immune.48
2. Mason, Noonan, and the "Basic Policy" Requirement
Since Evangelical, the Washington Supreme Court has stressed that
only acts rising to the level of basic policy qualify for the discretionary
immunity exception.49 In Mason v. Bitton, the supreme court stated
unequivocally that the immunity is restricted to acts involving basic
policy discretion.5 ° In Noonan v. State, by contrast, the appeals court
stepped outside the basic policy parameters established in Mason by
applying discretionary immunity to parole board decisions.5'
In Mason, the administrator of an estate sued the state for negli-
gence. 52 State and city police officers had conducted a high-speed
chase resulting in the decedent's death. 53 The court held that the deci-
sions to conduct and continue the pursuit involved discretion at an
operational level and were therefore subject to liability.54 Because the
decisions to conduct and continue the pursuit did not require discre-
tion at the level of basic policy, they did not fall within the discretion-
46. 67 Wash. 2d at 259, 407 P.2d at 447.
47. Id. at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
48. Id.
49. Although Evangelical may be read as granting immunity to acts involving the mere
implementation of basic policy, the court has tacitly rejected this reading as overbroad. See, e.g.,
Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 328, 534 P.2d 1360, 1365 (1975).
50. Id. at 328, 534 P.2d at 1365.
51. 53 Wash. App. 558, 769 P.2d 313, cert. denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1027 (1989).
52. 85 Wash. 2d at 322-23, 534 P.2d at 1361-62.
53. Id.




ary immunity exception. The acts at issue involved discretion by
officers "in the field," as opposed to discretion at a "truly executive"
level. 5 In the face of a statute requiring police officers to exercise
caution when deciding to conduct a high-speed chase, the court con-
cluded that immunizing such decisions would circumvent the legisla-
ture's intention to subject governmental entities to liability for their
tortious acts. 6 Discretionary immunity, stressed the court, is "strictly
limited to acts involving basic policy discretion."57
In Noonan v. State,"5 the Washington Court of Appeals extended
the discretionary immunity exception to parole board determina-
tions. 9 In Noonan, persons injured by a parolee who absconded from
a private, nonsecure alcohol treatment facility sued the state. The
parolee had attempted to abduct one woman at knife-point and had
raped and kidnapped another while armed with a knife and gun.60
The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the state, holding
that parole determinations are shielded from liability under the discre-
tionary immunity exception. While noting that a parole decision
"requires the exercise of policy evaluation, expertise, and judgment,"61
the court failed to inquire into whether it rises to the level of basic
policy.6
2
The Noonan court's analysis is similar to that rejected as inadequate
by the supreme court when it reviewed two earlier appeals court cases,
Clipse v. Gillis 63 and Moloney v. Tribune Publishing Co.' 4 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court overruled these cases for purporting to extend
55. Id. at 328, 534 P.2d at 1365.
56. Id. at 328-29, 534 P.2d at 1365.
57. Id. at 327, 534 P.2d at 1364 (emphasis in original). The state supreme court since Mason
has emphasized the central importance of the basic policy requirement. See, e.g., Petersen v.
State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 434, 671 P.2d 230, 240 (1983) (the scope of discretionary immunity
"should be no greater than is required to give legislative and executive policy-makers sufficient
breathing space in which to perform their policymaking functions") (quoting Tarasoffv. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 445, 551 P.2d 334, 350, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 30 (1976)); Chambers-
Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 282, 669 P.2d 451, 456 (1983) (the "exercise of
discretionary acts at a basic policy level is immune from suit, whereas the exercise of
discretionary acts at an operational level is not").
58. 53 Wash. App. 558, 769 P.2d 313, cert denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1027, 769 P.2d 313 (1989).
59. The issue of discretionary immunity for parole decisions was one of first impression in
Washington. Id. at 563, 769 P.2d at 316.
60. Id. at 560, 769 P.2d at 314.
61. Id. at 563, 769 P.2d at 316.
62. Id. at 565, 769 P.2d at 317.
63. See Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 589-90, 664 P.2d 492, 498 (1983)
(overruling Clipse v. Gillis, 20 Wash. App. 691, 582 P.2d 555 (1978)).
64. Id. (overruling Moloney v. Tribune Publishing Co., 26 Wash. App. 357, 613 P.2d 1179,
cerL denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1014 (1980)).
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absolute immunity to all discretionary acts.6 5 In Clipse, the appellate
court held that the investigation of criminal complaints by police
officers was discretionary and therefore immune.66 Similarly, in
Moloney the appellate court granted discretionary immunity to police
officers engaged in disclosing investigative information to the press.67
In both instances, the supreme court specified that the lower courts
had failed to inquire whether the challenged conduct was a basic pol-
icy decision.68
3. The King Corollary: The "Considered Decision" Requirement
In King v. City of Seattle, 69 the Washington Supreme Court added a
corollary to the test laid down in Evangelical. The King court held
that the discretionary immunity analysis of Evangelical applies only to
acts that involve a conscious weighing of risks and advantages. If a
governmental agent fails to render such a "considered" decision in a
particular instance, the issue of discretionary immunity is not reached
and the act is subject to liability.7°
In King, purchasers of real property sought damages from the city
for wrongful refusal to issue street use and building permits.7 The
city claimed its acts were of a wholly "governmental, policy-imple-
menting character" and thus exempt from liability.72 Because the trial
court found the acts arbitrary and capricious, however, the King court
held that an inquiry into their purportedly discretionary nature was
superfluous. The city was subject to tort liability for not having ren-
dered an appropriately considered decision.73
The King court sought to formulate a workable definition of "dis-
cretionary" that would limit the immunity to its stated rationale. Rec-
ognizing that virtually all official acts involve discretion of some
65. Id.
66. Clipse v. Gillis, 20 Wash. App. 691, 695-96, 582 P.2d 555, 557-58 (1978).
67. Moloney v. Tribune Publishing Co., 26 Wash. App. 357, 360, 613 P.2d 1179, 1181-82
(1980).
68. Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 283, 669 P.2d 451, 457 (1983);
Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 589, 664 P.2d 492, 498 (1983) (discussing Clipse and
Moloney).
69. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
70. Id. at 245-47, 525 P.2d at 232-33. Logically, the considered decision issue is a threshold
matter that should be addressed prior to examining the questions posed in Evangelical. In
practice, however, the court typically takes up the issue only after a discussion of the Evangelical
test. See, e.g., Emsley v. Army Nat'l Guard, 106 Wash. 2d 474, 479-80, 722 P.2d 1299, 1302-03
(1986); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d at 245-47, 525 P.2d at 232-33.
71. 84 Wash. 2d at 241-42, 525 P.2d at 230-31.
72. Id. at 243, 525 P.2d at 231.
73. Id. at 246-47, 525 P.2d at 233.
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kind,74 the King court rejected a semantic inquiry into the meaning of
"discretionary" and directed instead that judicial investigation be
guided by the purpose of the discretionary immunity doctrine: to
assure that courts do not pass judgment on basic policy decisions com-
mitted to coordinate branches of government.75 In view of that pur-
pose, the state must show that such a policy decision, consciously
balancing risks and advantages, actually occurred." Otherwise, the
acts at issue are subject to tort liability.77
II. THE APPLICATION OF DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY
TO EARLY RELEASE DECISIONS
Early release determinations should not be shielded from liability by
discretionary immunity, for both doctrinal and policy reasons. First,
parole and work release decisions fall outside the narrow parameters
of the discretionary immunity exception as established in Evangelical
and its progeny. Second, absolute immunity allows a pursuit of early
release program objectives insulated from the competing interest of
public safety. Because parole and work release decisions involve the
management of violent and sex offenders, program administrators
should be provided incentives to exercise care commensurate with the
potential for harm arising from the premature release of such
offenders.
A. The Doctrinal Basis for Liability
The purpose of Washington's discretionary immunity exception is
to preclude judicial review of high-level, basic policy decisions within
the province of coordinate branches of government.7" Determined to
prevent the exception from engulfing the rule of governmental liabil-
ity,79 the court has repeatedly emphasized that it applies only to con-
sidered acts within the arena of basic policy.s° The Washington
74. The court noted that "it would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how
directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even
if it involved only the driving of a nail." Id. at 246, 525 P.2d at 232 (quoting Johnson v. State, 69
Cal. 2d 782, 788, 447 P.2d 352, 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1968)).
75. Id. at 246, 525 P.2d at 232-33.
76. Id. at 246, 525 P.2d at 233.
77. In Noonan, the Court of Appeals simply asserted that the specific parole determination at
issue was a considered decision without indicating whether the state had shown the parole board
to have rendered one. 53 Wash. App. 558, 565 769 P.2d 313, 317, cert. denied, 112 Wash. 2d
1027, 769 P.2d 313 (1989).
78. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246, 525 P.2d 228, 233 (1974).
79. Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 329, 534 P.2d 1360, 1365 (1975).
80. For a list of cases, see supra note 57.
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Supreme Court's decisions in Evangelical, 81 King,"s and Mason83 artic-
ulate the test for determining whether the state should be granted dis-
cretionary immunity for its acts. When this test is applied to the
typical facts of a parole board decision, it is apparent that such deci-
sions should be subject to liability. The same conclusion applies to
work release decisions.
1. Basic Policy Discretion and Early Release Decisions
The starting point for judicial inquiry into whether an official act
qualifies for discretionary immunity is the test set forth in Evangeli-
cal 84 In the context of early release decisions, three of the four issues
presented for examination under the test are straightforward and may
be disposed of simply. The remaining issue, that of basic policy discre-
tion, requires closer inspection.
As regards the parole board, the first question is whether the board
possesses the requisite authority to render a parole determination. 8'
The answer is yes. Sections 9.95.100 and .110 of the Revised Code of
Washington empower the board to release prisoners sentenced under
the pre-SRA system prior to the expiration of their maximum terms.
86
The second and third issues may be taken together. First, does the
board's decision necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, pro-
gram, or objective? Second, is the board's decision essential to the
realization of the policy involved?87 The answer to both questions is
yes. The parole decision, by definition, not only involves the parole
program but is integral to its operation. Because the legislature envis-
aged the parole program as a central element in its pre-SRA policy of
rehabilitation,88 the parole decision is also an essential element in the
operation of that policy.89
81. Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440
(1965).
82. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 239, 525 P.2d at 228.
83. Mason, 85 Wash. 2d at 321, 534 P.2d at 1360.
84. 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
85. Id. For ease of discussion, the order of the questions has been changed from that
presented in Evangelical
86. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.95.100-.110 (1989).
87. 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445. These two questions, though involving basic policy,
are distinct from the question of basic policy discretion. See supra notes 49-57 and
accompanying text.
88. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.100 (1989); Act of January 24, 1990;
BOERNER, supra note 5, at § 2.2(b).
89. A literal reading of Evangelical would require the court to ask whether the act in question
is essential to the realization of a basic governmental program or policy. Under this inquiry, a
parole decision could not qualify for discretionary immunity because a given decision cannot
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The fourth question is at the heart of the Evangelical test, and at the
heart of any serious inquiry into the applicability of discretionary
immunity to a given act. The issue is whether the board's decision
required the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and exper-
tise.9" There is little doubt that a parole decision requires the exercise
of policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise; the difficulty lies in
determining whether they are exercised at the level of basic policy.
The court has not enunciated a bright line test for deciding this issue,
but has instead used common sense criteria to determine whether offi-
cial acts involve basic policy discretion.91
The parole system involves numerous acts that range from basic
policy determinations to operational acts. Certainly, the legislative
decision to establish the parole system qualifies as basic policy. On the
other hand, the decisions rendered by parole officers in the course of
parolee supervision are more closely analogous to the operational deci-
sions of police officers in the field held subject to liability in Mason. 92
Parole determinations lie somewhere between the two. However,
several characteristics of the parole decision suggest that it more
closely resembles the operational decisions of police officers in the field
than the basic policy decision to establish the program. An individual
parole determination involves not the formulation of basic policy, but
its implementation in a specific instance.93 Like the choice faced by
the police officers in Mason of whether to conduct a high-speed chase,
the parole board's decision to release a given inmate requires the exer-
cise of judgment regarding the potential risks posed by the specific
decision at hand.
In each instance, moreover, discretion is bounded by a statutory
limitation. The police officers in Mason were directed to exercise cau-
change the course or direction of the program or the policy. 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at
445. However, the court has generally inquired instead into whether the class of acts of which
the specific act is a particular instance is essential. See, eg., Emsley v. Army Nat'l Guard, 106
Wash. 2d 474, 480-81, 722 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1986) (instance of firing artillery held essential to
the realization of the basic governmental objective of training the National Guard).
90. 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
91. See, e-g., Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 328, 534 P.2d 1360, 1365 (1975) (discretion
exercised by police officers "in the field" is operational).
92. 85 Wash. 2d at 328, 534 P.2d at 1365.
93. The supreme court in King tacitly rejected Evangelical's application of discretionary
immunity to the mere implementation of policy. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246, 525 P.2d 228, 233
(1974). Cf. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 254, 407 P.2d at 444. The King court stipulated that the
determination of the status of a given act should be guided by the purpose of the exception: to
preclude judicial review of policy decisions in the province of coordinate branches of
government. 84 Wash. 2d at 246, 525 P.2d at 232-33. In view of this purpose, the
implementation of policy falls outside the scope of the immunity.
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tion,94 while the parole board must satisfy itself that a given inmate's
rehabilitation is complete and the inmate is fit for release.95 In Mason,
the court held that the statute articulated a standard to which the
police officers were accountable. 96 In the present case, the language of
the parole statute likewise establishes a standard to which the board
should be accountable. Therefore, a parole determination, which
requires the application of statutory and administrative guidelines in a
specific instance, involves discretion on an operational level and fails
the Evangelical test.97
When the court of appeals addressed the issue of discretionary
immunity for parole board decisions in Noonan v. State, it failed to
recognize the truly operational nature of parole determinations.98 The
Noonan court noted that the parole decision involves policy evalua-
tion, expertise, and judgment, and stated simply that such a determi-
nation necessarily rests on the board's experience and judgment
concerning the risks attendant upon an offender's integration into soci-
ety.99 Although this point highlights the discretionary nature of
parole determinations, it fails to address the key issue whether the
board's discretion is exercised at the level of basic policy. Indeed, the
court's analysis resembles that already rejected as inadequate by the
Washington Supreme Court when it overruled two prior appellate
court decisions."o
Under the Evangelical test, work release decisions are properly sub-
ject to liability as well. The Secretary of the Department of Correc-
tions possesses the requisite statutory authority to allow inmates to
participate in work release.'' The work release decision by definition
involves the work release program and, indeed, is essential to it.1
0 2
94. 85 Wash. 2d at 323-24, 534 P.2d at 1362.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1989).
96. 85 Wash. 2d at 328-29, 534 P.2d at 1365.
97. At least one other court has concluded that discretionary immunity for parole board
decisions is inappropriate. In Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564
P.2d 1227, 1229-30 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court established a rule of qualified immunity
for parole decisions. The court was faced with facts and a statute similar to those in Noonan.
98. Noonan v. State, 53 Wash. App. 558, 769 P.2d 313, cert. denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1027, 769
P.2d 313 (1989).
99. Id. at 563, 769 P.2d at 316. The Noonan court went so far as to indicate in dicta that
immunity should extend to "those who under [the parole board's] supervision prepare
investigation reports and recommendations that underlie the Board's decision." Id. at 565-66,
769 P.2d at 317.
100. See Moloney v. Tribune Pub. Co., 26 Wash. App. 357, 613 P.2d 1179 (1980), overruled,
Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 664 P.2d 492 (1983); Clipse v. Gillis, 20 Wash. App.
691, 582 P.2d 555 (1978).
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 72.65.200 (1989).
102. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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However, a determination whether to place an inmate in the program
does not involve discretion at the basic policy level. Rather, it requires
discretion in the implementation of basic policy set forth in statutory
and departmental guidelines. Work release decisions are therefore
operational in nature and fall outside the scope of the discretionary
immunity exception.1
0 3
2. "Considered" Early Release Decisions
Because early release determinations fail to meet the basic policy
requirement of the Evangelical test, there would normally be no need
for judicial inquiry into whether the decision maker, in a particular
instance, rendered a considered decision. If, however, the supreme
court were to hold that early release determinations do involve basic
policy discretion under Evangelical, such an inquiry would be
required."° Unless the state could demonstrate that the particular
decision involved a conscious weighing of its risks and advantages, it
would be subject to liability even if it were otherwise immune. '
0 5
Given the potential risk of harm attendant upon early release deter-
minations, an inquiry into the considered decision requirement would
likely lead a court to examine at least two issues. The first is whether
the decision was rendered in compliance with the relevant internal
guidelines of the parole board or Department of Corrections; 10 6 the
second, whether the decision was reasonable in view of the relevant
statutory imperatives.1 7
When the Noonan court examined the considered decision require-
ment, it did not inquire into whether the board had engaged in the
requisite balancing of risks and advantages. The court simply con-
cluded that "[t]he wisdom of the decision is not subject to attack if, as
here, it is a considered decision."10' 8 Either the court was satisfied on
the basis of evidence not mentioned in its opinion that the decision was
a considered one, or it failed to conduct the required inquiry. In light
103. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
104. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246-47, 525 P.2d 228, 232-33 (1974).
105. Id.
106. For the parole board's decision making criteria and procedures, see generally ISRB
REP., Mar. 1987, supra note 17; Rules, supra note 18. Parole board guidelines require the
Department of Corrections to furnish documents to the board prior to a parole meeting or
decision. These include the institutional progress report covering the offender's adjustment,
achievement, infractions, and program participation; a current psychological or psychiatric
report, if requested by the board; and a full review and report from the superintendent regarding
the offender's prospects for rehabilitation. Rules, supra note 18, at 14-15.
107. See supra notes 13-18 and 28-30 and accompanying text.
108. Noonan v. State, 53 Wash. App. 558, 565, 769 P.2d 313, 317, cert. denied, 112 Wash. 2d
1027, 769 P.2d 313 (1989).
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of the supreme court's criticism of Clipse'0 9 and Moloney, 110 a failure
to make this inquiry might constitute reversible error."'
B. The Normative Basis for Liability
Although supreme court doctrine alone suggests the propriety of
governmental liability for early release decisions, important policy
concerns compel the same conclusion. The incentives provided by lia-
bility would be instrumental in promoting due care by program
administrators in the management of a potentially highly dangerous
population.
When parolees are selected from the ranks of dangerous offenders,
the possibility of harm from the negligent assessment of an inmate's
suitability for parole is great. This potential is particularly well illus-
trated by the occasions on which the board has released large numbers
of inmates from such populations. In 1986, the Myers and Addleman
courts required the board to reconsider, but not necessarily to modify,
the sentence lengths for all offenders convicted under the indetermi-
nate sentencing system.112 As a result of sentence review, the board
granted accelerated parole eligibility to forty percent of these offend-
ers.' 13 According to the board, however, the population from which
the parolees were drawn was comprised of "predominantly very seri-
ous offenders" who posed a "serious risk" to public safety on the basis
of their criminal histories.114 A negligent decision granting parole in
this context would have carried, by the parole board's own estimation,
a serious risk of grave harm to individual members of the public.
Liability in this setting and in others like it would be useful in pro-
viding incentives to the board to make parole decisions with great care
and to distinguish offenders likely to reoffend from those who are not,
as the statutes direct.115 These incentives are especially important
today, given the high concentration of violent and sex offenders in the
population remaining under parole board jurisdiction.116
109. See Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 589-90, 664 P.2d 492, 498 (1983).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. In re Myers, 105 Wash. 2d 257, 268-69, 714 P.2d 303, 309 (1986); Addleman v. Board
of Prison Terms & Paroles 107 Wash. 2d 503, 510-11, 730 P.2d 1327, 1332 (1986). For a brief
discussion of these decisions, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
113. ISRB REP., Jan. 1988, supra note 21, at 7.
114. ISRB REP., Mar. 1987, supra note 17, at 2.
115. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.95.100, .170 (1989).
116. Approximately 95% of the offenders remaining under parole board jurisdiction as of
February 20, 1990, were "serious, violent" offenders. Approximately one-third of the offenders
remaining under parole board jurisdiction have committed sex crimes. Bail, supra note 26.
634
Discretionary Immunity
The prophylactic functions of liability are equally applicable to
work release. During fiscal years 1987, 1988, and 1989, a high per-
centage of the work release population was composed of violent or sex
offenders.1 17 Liability for negligence would encourage decision mak-
ers to study candidates carefully and grant work release only to those
who are unlikely, based on their history and profile, to present a threat
of serious harm if assigned to the program.
Liability would also provide incentives for parole and work release
administrators to abide by their respective statutory and administra-
tive guidelines. 118 Parole decisions are subject to a statutory injunc-
tion that offenders not be released until, in the board's opinion, their
rehabilitation is complete." 9 The board is also required to make pub-
lic safety its highest priority and to thoroughly familiarize itself with a
candidate's criminal history and personality before rendering its deci-
sion. '2 Similarly, work release determinations involving "sexually
violent offenders" are now subject to a 1990 amendment making pub-
lic safety the primary consideration.12 1 Work release decisions are
also subject to Department of Corrections guidelines emphasizing cau-
tion and a need to minimize risks of harm to the public.122
Liability for negligent early release determinations is proper even
though such decisions involve, to a degree, a balancing of imponder-
ables regarding the likelihood of recidivism. Statutory and adminis-
trative admonitions to evaluate candidates carefully and exercise
informed judgment regarding their suitability for early release attests
to the capacity of diligence to reduce the risk of releasing persons who
pose a danger to the community.'2 3
117. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
118. Few checks exist to guard against negligent parole or work release determinations. Such
decisions are not ordinarily subject to review, and the public cannot vote irresponsible early
release decision makers out of office. Members of the parole board, for example, cannot be
removed except for cause determined by the superior court of Thurston County. WASH. REv.
CoDE § 9.95.003 (1989). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that "[alccountability
through tort liability in areas outside the narrow [basic policy] exception... may be the only way
of assuring a certain standard of performance from governmental entities." Bender v. City of
Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 590, 664 P.2d 492, 498 (1983).
119. WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.95.100 (1989).
120. Id § 9.95.170 (1989); Act of January 24, 1990.
121. Act of January 24, 1990, supra note 12.
122. See Policy 300.380, supra note 28, at 2-3.
123. Even apart from the statutory and administrative admonitions, it is a well-established
principle of tort law that where the risk of harm is great, commensurately great care is required:
"One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the




Given the heightened legislative and public concern over the han-
dling of dangerous offenders,' 2 4 a rule providing redress to persons
harmed in the event of a negligent release may increase public confi-
dence in early release programs. Accountability might therefore
enhance the viability of these activities. Moreover, because liability is
likely to provide incentives to greater care, costly judgments for negli-
gent acts are unlikely to occur with a frequency that would signifi-
cantly impair the operation of the programs.
C A Proposed Liability Rule for Early Release Decisions
An appropriate liability rule for negligent parole and work release
determinations would create incentives to due care without imposing
an unreasonable burden on the state. The rule proposed here would
allow a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence on the
part of officials responsible for early release decisions by showing that
a person sentenced for a violent or sex crime committed either a vio-
lent or sex crime while on parole or work release. The burden of pro-
duction 25 would then shift to the state to show that it was reasonable,
in light of the offender's criminal history and profile, to conclude that
the offender did not pose a risk of committing a violent or sex crime
while on early release. If the state was unable to produce evidence
from which a trier of fact could find the decision to have been reason-
able, the burden of proof would reside with the state to justify its deci-
sion in light of the offender's history and profile. If the state could
adduce such evidence, however, the plaintiff would have the ultimate
burden of proving the decision was unreasonable and therefore
negligent.
The rule enunciated here is narrow, proposing liability for early
release decisions only in instances of violent or sex crimes. Thus,
124. Concern over injuries inflicted by violent repeat sex offenders in Washington prompted
the state attorney general to convene a committee to draft legislation making public safety a "top
priority" in the state's handling of such individuals. See ATTORNEY GEN.'S EXECUTIVE COMM.
ON VIOLENT SEX OFFENDERS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS p. 1 (Sept. 1989). It also
prompted the 1989-90 legislative session to enact a number of laws aimed at reducing the risks
these persons pose to the public. Among other things, the new laws enjoin the parole board and
Department of Corrections to make public safety the primary consideration in their discretionary
decisions regarding all pre-SRA offenders and post-SRA violent sex offenders. However, with
the exception of "sexually violent" offenders, the public safety provisions do not address violent
offenders whose crimes of conviction occurred after June 30, 1984. Moreover, they do not
proscribe parole or work release for violent or sex offenders. Finally, they do not apply to early
release decisions rendered prior to July 1, 1990. See Act of January 24, 1990, supra note 12.
125. The burden of production refers to the obligation of a party to bring forward sufficient





unlike strict liability, the rule would not make the state an insurer of
every harm that might emanate from an early release decision. Under
the rule the state would not, for example, be liable for property dam-
age caused by offenders negligently granted early release. Similarly,
liability would not attach even in the case of violent or sex offenses if
the decision to place the offender on parole or work release was rea-
sonable based on the offender's history.
The rule would not unduly hamper program administrators in their
statutory duties or subject the state to unlimited financial vulnerabil-
ity. Decision makers would not be required to actually predict future
criminal behavior, but rather to make'reasonable assessments of the
risk an offender poses of recidivism. Imposing a burden of production
upon the state would provide an incentive strong enough to encourage
decision makers to carefully evaluate each candidate, to generate a
paper record, and to place those deliberations on that record to guard
against suit. At the same time, because the burden of proof shifts to
the state only if it is unable to meet a relatively light burden of produc-
tion, the rule is unlikely to invite frivolous claims.126
III. CONCLUSION
The application of discretionary immunity to parole and work
release determinations is inappropriate both doctrinally and norma-
tively. The evolution of discretionary immunity in Washington as
elaborated by the state supreme court indicates that such decisions fall
outside the narrow purview of the doctrine. Moreover, if law is to
consist of more than a body of internally consistent rules, it must be
responsive to the values it professes to serve, to the context in which
its decisions occur, and to the results its decisions produce. Liability
for negligence would promote careful deliberation by parole and work
release administrators in compliance with their respective mandates.
Liability would also provide a remedy where one is appropriate, and
would ultimately enhance the legitimacy of state programs by render-
ing them accountable where their negligent operation results in harm.
Marie Aglion
126. Given the comparatively light burden on the state and the potentially grave risk of harm
attending negligent decisions, a negligence standard is superior to a gross negligence standard.
The latter would not promote the level of care enjoined by the applicable statutes, or
commensurate with the nature of the activity itself.
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